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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1930s, states have generated revenue by taxing business
transactions, including the sale of goods.1 One of the most prominent
forms of state taxation is the sales tax and its complementary use tax.2
A state may levy a tax on sales made within its borders (a "sales" tax)
and collect the tax from the merchant. A state may complement its
sales tax with a "use" tax on property used in the state as well, thereby
reaching sales that took place beyond its borders but that resulted in
property purchased for use within its borders.
Often a use tax must be collected from the purchaser, but the
purchaser rarely pays the tax. As a consequence, many mail order or
Internet 3 purchases from out-of-state vendors escape tax altogether.
This tax avoidance has recently become a major revenue issue for
states because the Internet has experienced massive growth in retail
sales. Exactly how much commerce is being conducted over the
Internet is difficult to say. However, it is safe to say that the figure is
already very large and will continue to grow at a frenetic pace, perhaps
into the hundreds of billions of dollars in the very near future.4
1. See PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
578 (1981).
2. See id. See also William F. Fox, Importance of the Sales Tax in the 21st Century, in THE
SALES TAX IN THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (Matthew N. Murray & William F. Fox eds., 1997)
(stating that from 1932 to 1969 forty-five states enacted a sales tax); Jon Gworek, The Imposition
of Use Tax Collection Liability on Mail-Order Retailers: What Happens When the Bellas Hess
Barrier Is Removed?, 23 CONN. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (1991) (stating that forty-five states currently
have enacted both sales and use taxes and that only Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire,
and Oregon have neither tax).
3. As used in this article, the term "Internet" has the same meaning as in the Internet Tax
Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1104(4), 112 Stat. 2681, which defines "Internet" as "the
myriad of computer and telecommunications facilities, including equipment and operating
software, which comprise the interconnected worldwide network of networks that employ the
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, or any predecessor or successor protocols to
such protocol, to communicate information of all kinds by wire or radio."
4. Depending on what one classifies under the heading "Internet commerce," the figures
of current and projected revenues vary widely, but all are quite large. See John Swartz, Clinton
Sides with Retailers; President Behind Bill for Tax-Free Internet, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 26, 1998, at
Cl (estimating that on-line retail shopping would double from $2.4 billion in 1997 to $4.8 billion
in 1998); John Swartz, E-Commerce Is Hottest Thing at Net Show, S.F. CHRON., March 12, 1998,
at El (estimating that "e-commerce sales" will grow to between $80 billion and $255 billion by
the year 2000, with a White House estimate of $300 billion by 2002); Jube Shiver Jr., The New
Marketplace Electronic Commerce Is Finally Taking Off, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1997, at Dl
(providing an estimate of growth in "Internet business" from $8 billion in 1997 to $327 billion
in 2002); Leslie Kaufman & Saul Hansell Estimates for On-Line Shopping Exceed the Most Bullish
Forecasts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1998, at Al (estimating that on-line retail sales in 1998 would
reach $5 billion-surpassing the $4.8 billion estimate in the Swartz article above); Michael
Gannon, From Content to Commerce: VCS Flocked to E-Commerce, VENTURE CAPITAL J., Jan.
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It is a fair assumption that the retail sales conducted over the
Internet represent, to a significant extent, retail sales that once took
place locally. Thus, the inability of states to tax these sales has pushed
Internet taxation to the forefront of many tax policy discussions. Of
central concern is that the imposition of taxes on Internet commerce
may stifle the fledgling industry's growth.
If merchants must collect an Internet sales tax, the dramatic
growth of Internet sales may be curbed because smaller merchants may
find compliance onerous. Alternatively, trying to collect a use tax from
Internet purchases may place such a great burden on states that only
a minimal amount of tax will be collected.
As a reactionary measure, Congress has enacted the Internet Tax
Freedom Act, placing a moratorium on many new Internet taxes, at
both the state and federal levels, so that the issue can be studied.5
Given the impending expiration of the moratorium,6 it is likely only
a matter of time before some method of taxing Internet commerce is
adopted.
Although there are many possible ways to tax Internet sales, both
the Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution limit state
taxation of sales made through mail-order catalogues or the Internet.
These constitutional impediments to state taxation will have to be
addressed regardless of the method of taxation that legislatures
eventually adopt. The longer we postpone legislating a tax on Internet
transactions, the greater the cost for Internet industries to implement
its collection.
The remainder of this Comment considers how Internet sales
could be taxed if Congressional action is taken to remove the Com-
merce Clause impediments, which would leave only Due Process
Clause limitations on Internet taxation. Though three potential
1, 1999 (estimating on-line retail sales at $7 billion for 1998 and projected growth to $41 billion
by 2002); Richard W. Stevenson, Tangled Web of Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1998, § 4, at 3
(reporting estimates that shortly after the turn of the century states could be losing up to $12
billion in sales tax revenue, roughly 8% of the total revenues from such taxes).
5. The Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1101(a)(2), 112 Stat. 2681,
provides that "[n]o State or political subdivision thereof shall impose any of the following taxes
during the period beginning on October 1, 1998, and ending 3 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act." It then prohibits "discriminatory" taxes, which are defined as taxes that
include attempts to appoint local service providers as agents of remote sellers for purposes of
determining tax collection obligations, as well as a variety of other methods that could also be
used in an attempt to implement a sales or use tax on such commerce. Id. at § 1104(2).
Furthermore, the Act exempts taxes "otherwise permissible by or under the Constitution of the
United States," which, as this Comment discusses, does not include sales taxes on Internet
commerce. Id. at § 1101(b).
6. Id.
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solutions are addressed and analyzed for their potential treatment under
the Due Process Clause, this Comment concludes that a federal
uniform tax on Internet sales of goods will achieve the best balance of
interests while avoiding Due Process problems. Part Two provides the
reader with a basic description of the current law in the area of sales
and use taxes and the problems the Internet poses for that framework.
Part Three presents three possible models for taxing Internet commerce
and highlights the problems each model presents, both economically
and within the legal framework described in Part Two. Proceeding on
the assumption that Congress has removed the Commerce Clause
impediment, Part Four then applies the Due Process Clause to each
model, concluding that a federal uniform tax achieves the best balance
of interests while avoiding the Due Process Clause problems inherent
in the other models. Part Five then discusses the federal uniform tax
in more detail, including several policy issues that make a federal
solution the most desirable considering the international scope of the
Internet.
II. DEFINITION OF SALES AND USE TAXES AND CURRENT
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
Although a sales tax is familiar to most people, a use tax is not.
A "sales tax" is a tax added to the price of an item by a merchant at
the point of sale to the consumer. The consumer pays the tax on top
of the price of the item. The merchant then sets aside the tax and
remits it to the state in accordance with the taxing state's statute.7
On the other hand, a "use tax" is a tax on the "privilege of using,
consuming, distributing or storing tangible personal property after it
is brought into [the] State from without [the] State."'8 For example,
a use tax may be levied on a person who purchases a product in one
state for use in the taxing state. The purchaser pays the tax, which
generally equates with the sales tax the purchaser would have paid had
he purchased the item within the taxing state) minus any sales tax
paid in the state of purchase.1" The goal of the use tax is to ensure
that the consumer pays the same amount of tax on any taxable item no
matter where the item is purchased." The ultimate purpose is to
make tax a neutral factor in the purchaser's decisions.
7. See Kathryn L. Moore, State and Local Taxation: When Will Congress Intervene?, 23 J.
LEGIS. 171, 176-77 (1997).
8. Id. at 177 (citing Woods v. M.J. Kelley, Co., 592 S.W.2d 567, 570 (Tenn. 1980)).
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
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The merchant collects and remits a sales tax, while the purchaser
pays a use tax.12 While the two taxes are economically identical from
the purchaser's perspective, because they place the same burden on the
purchaser in terms of the amount of tax paid and the items to which
the tax is applied,13 in reality the two taxes yield very different
revenues for the state because of the difficulty in collecting the use tax
from purchasers who are legally required to pay it.14
From the state's standpoint it is beneficial to have merchants
collect and remit all taxes related to the sale of tangible goods. States
are only able to place this burden of collection on merchants physically
present within the state's boundaries."5 This limitation is due to
historical developments in Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. 6 The result is that a state is powerless to force an out-
of-state merchant to collect the use tax owed by the state's citizens
when that state's citizens venture out of the taxing state to make
purchases.
The problems of sales and use tax jurisdiction can be best
demonstrated through the following hypothetical:
STATE A STATE B
MI M2
C
C is a resident of State A. MI is a retailer doing business only in
State A. M2 is a retailer doing business only in State B. State A levies
a sales tax of ten percent on all purchases. It also levies a use tax of
12. See Moore, supra note 7, at 176-77.
13. See id. at 177.
14. See Saba Ashraf, Virtual Taxation: State Taxation of Internet and On-Line Sales, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 605, 611 (1997).
15. See HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 579-80.
16. For a detailed explanation, see Part IV.A, infra. At this juncture the only point to
recognize is that, from the state government's standpoint, requiring a merchant to collect and
remit tax is much simpler than placing that burden on consumers. There are fewer merchants
than consumers, and a state can enforce the law much more easily against merchants. Generally
speaking, the relatively small amount of use tax the average consumer is legally obligated to remit
each year would make the collection of the use tax administratively unfeasible, yet in the
aggregate, the amount of revenue lost each year due to the inability to enforce the use tax is
probably quite large in most states. See generally R. Scot Grierson, State Taxation of the
Information Superhighway: A Proposal for Taxation of Information Services, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT.
L.J. 603, 644 (1996).
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ten percent on its residents, but allows a credit against the use tax for
any sales tax already paid on the item. State B levies a sales tax of five
percent.
If C purchases a widget from M1 for $100, C pays a sales tax of
$10. Mi will collect and pay the tax to State A. Under this traditional
sales tax, State A has the power to tax C and burden MI with the
collection duty because both are physically present within State A.17
Additionally, C would also be liable for remitting the use tax to State
A; however, C would get a credit for the sales tax already paid, which
would reduce the use tax to zero. It is in this manner that use taxes
are effectively only applicable to out-of-state purchases."1
If C makes the same purchase in State B for $100, C pays a sales
tax of $5. M2 will collect and remit this tax to State B. If C uses,
consumes, distributes, or stores the widget in State A, C must remit
the appropriate use tax to State A. In this case, the use tax is $10
minus the $5 credit for the sales tax paid for a total use tax of $5. The
total tax burden on C is $10 either way.19
When the sales and use taxes work properly, they reduce the
shifting economic effects inherent in most tax schemes. That is, the
imposition of the taxes has no effect other than to raise revenue. A
shifting economic effect is a collateral effect of taxing a transaction; the
most common effects will be a consumer's decision to purchase
elsewhere, or a vendor's decision to either reduce prices or move to a
lower tax jurisdiction.
The practical problem with a theoretically pure tax scheme is that
when C returns to State A, C is unlikely to remit the use tax and State
A is unlikely to have any knowledge of C's purchase in State B. This
results in a disadvantage to M1 who cannot compete with M2's
effectively lower prices because of the higher tax placed on Mi's sales.
The fundamental purpose of the use tax is to correct this problem.2"
Of course, the efficacy of this solution diminishes the closer a merchant
is to the border of a lower tax jurisdiction. When traveling to the
lower tax jurisdiction is no longer a significant burden on the
17. See State Tax Comm'n of Utah v. Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 372 U.S. 605, 606
(1963) (holding that "a State may levy and collect a sales tax ... [when] passage of title and
delivery to the purchaser took place within the State").
18. There is an obvious problem if both a sales and use tax are imposed on the same item
and no credit is allowed against the use tax for sales tax already paid. The result is double
taxation. However, as a practical matter, state statutes contain the same description on items
subject to both taxes. Theoretically, such a double tax would be permissible because technically
the taxes are aimed at different activities: sales and uses.
19. See Ashraf, supra note 14, at 611.
20. See HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 613-14.
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purchaser, it is likely that a merchant required to collect a higher tax
will have to lower its prices and ultimately bear some of the sales tax
itself to remain competitive.
States, lacking the resources to chase down every consumer liable
for the use tax, have attempted to require out-of-state vendors to
collect and remit the use tax owed by that state's residents.2 The
central issue is whether the state has jurisdiction over the vendor. The
United States Supreme Court has recently set out the constitutional
requirements that enable a state to place the burden of collecting its
sales and use taxes on merchants. In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,22
the Court held that the Due Process Clause's "minimum contacts" test
must be satisfied and that the Commerce Clause requires the merchant
to have a "physical presence" within the taxing state.
This decision clarifies the confusion created by National Bellas
Hess Inc. v. Illinois Department of Revenue,24 in which the Court
stated that physical presence was required by the Constitution, but did
not specify which part of the Constitution. The facts in the Quill
case were virtually identical to those in Bellas Hess. In Quill, North
Dakota sought to impose responsibility to collect its use tax on Quill
Corporation, which had no contact with the State of North Dakota
other than sending mail order catalogues to customers within North
Dakota.26
The Court first acknowledged that Bellas Hess relied on both the
Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution. It then
stated that each clause fulfills a distinct purpose in limiting the ability
of a state to tax an out-of-state vendor. The result is that a state may
have the requisite jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause, but yet
be unable to tax because the imposition of the tax would violate the
Commerce Clause.28 Perhaps most importantly, the Court stated that
Congress has plenary power to regulate in the area of interstate
commerce, but has no similar power to "authorize violations of the
Due Process Clause. '29
21. For a discussion of these state attempts, see Part B of this section.
22. 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992),
23. Id. at 314-15, 318.
24. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
25. Id. at 760.
26. Quill, 504 U.S. at 301-02.
27. Id. at 305.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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When analyzing the Due Process Clause, the Court defined the
limits of modem due process analysis by stating that the crucial issue
is whether the vendor aims any purposefully directed activity at the
forum state in such a manner as to provide fair warning to the vendor
that it may be subject to that state's jurisdiction." The Court
concluded that the magnitude of Quill Corporation's activities3 and
the obvious direction of those activities toward the state of North
Dakota were sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause.32 Due to
the sheer volume of catalogues sent to North Dakota, it would have
been difficult to justify any other outcome.
When analyzing the Commerce Clause, the Court held that the
fundamental purpose of that clause differs from that of the Due
Process Clause because the Commerce Clause protects the national
economy from undue burdens any one state might create, whereas the
Due Process Clause protects the individual from the burden of being
forced to litigate in a distant jurisdiction without notice.33 The Court
stated that the bright line physical presence test, while artificial in
some respects, benefits the area of state taxation by providing a clear
rule and creating settled expectations.34 In the end, the Court freely
acknowledged that, because of Congress' plenary power over Com-
merce Clause issues, "Congress is now free to decide whether, when,
and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-order
concerns with a duty to collect use taxes. 35
Given this current state of the law, and the distinction between
the Due Process and Commerce Clause requirements, many commen-
tators have discussed possible methods of imposing use tax collection
responsibility on out-of-state vendors within the current framework;
however, these commentators do not focus specific attention on retail
sales and specific constitutional issues relating to sales of this type.36
It seems clear that if Congress did nothing, the current state of the law
would prohibit states from imposing use tax collection responsibility
on out-of-state vendors whose only means of advertising is through a
30. Id. at 308.
31. The state court noted that Quill Corporation mailed out twenty-four tons of flyers and
catalogues every year to North Dakota residents. Quill, 504 U.S. at 304.
32. Id. at 308.
33. Id. at 313.
34. Id. at 317.
35. Id. at 318.
36. See generally Grierson, supra note 16, at 657-664. Many of the suggestions in the
Grierson article and in other articles address issues of service providers and do not focus specific
attention on the actual sale of tangible goods, which is the main focus here.
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web site." After all, if physically mailing catalogues into a state is
not enough, then it is hard to imagine that maintaining a web site
would be.
The basic assumption of the remainder of this Comment is that
Congress will remove the Commerce Clause's physical presence
requirement. Once this is done, the only hurdle remaining will be the
Due Process Clause.3" The Due Process Clause analysis will be
applied to whatever plan is 'adopted and, unlike Commerce Clause
analysis, cannot be manipulated through Congressional action. The
remainder of this Comment will analyze the application of the Due
Process Clause to three possible solutions to the Internet taxation
problem.39  However, first we must examine the jurisdictional
problems created by the Internet.
The Internet is not a tangible thing, but rather a concept.4"
Physically, it is made up of tiny computer networks scattered across
the globe, all of which share common computer languages and all of
which are linked through telecommunications." The Internet is
accessed through a personal computer connected to one of these tiny
local computer networks.42 The local computer network is then able
to contact all of the other local networks that make up the Internet,
and it allows the local consumer to access information anywhere the
Internet reaches. 43
While a variety of information is stored in the networks that can
be accessed via the Internet, one of the most prominent types of
information available is advertising. A vendor can establish a web site
37. Depending on where a sale made through a web site is deemed to take place, it may be
appropriate to speak of sales tax collection responsibility as well. This issue centers on whether
a sale takes place in the vendor's or purchaser's jurisdiction and is a matter discussed in Part Four
infra.
38. It is important to note that the nexus requirement is only one prong of a four-prong test
applied to determine the constitutionality of state taxes. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). The four prongs are: that the tax must be (1) applied to an activity
having substantial nexus with the taxing state (implicating the Due Process Clause and Commerce
Clause concerns of this Comment), (2) fairly apportioned, (3) nondiscriminatory against interstate
commerce, and (4) fairly related to the services provided by the state. See id.
39. The distinction between the Internet and mail-order industries is crucial because, based
on Quill alone, if Congress removes the physical presence requirement, then the mail-order
industry will be required to collect and remit taxes to the states where they make sales because
the act of bombarding a state's residents with catalogues fulfills Due Process requirements. The
same cannot be said for contacts between vendors and consumers made over the Internet.
40. See Grierson, supra note 16, at 609.
41. See id.
42. See Craig Peyton Gaumer, The Minimum Cyber-Contacts Test: An Emerging Standard
of Constitutional Personal Jurisdiction, 85 ILL. B.J. 58, 59 (Feb. 1997).
43. See Ashraf, supra note 14, at 606-07.
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on a local server that can be reached anywhere by anyone having access
to the Internet.44 Often these web sites are referred to as "virtual
storefronts"4 because they fill the same purpose as a display window
in a shop. The web site physically resides on the local computer
network often located in the same city as the vendor, but it has the
potential to be seen by an innumerable and far-reaching audience.46
The Internet, as a concept, defies traditional application of
jurisdictional jurisprudence because of its amorphous geographic
nature.47 It is not found in any one location. When a portion of the
Internet becomes inaccessible for any reason, the remainder of the
Internet continues to function by simply rerouting communications. 8
Due to the complexity of routing and the random method by which
individuals actually "surf"'49 through the available Internet resources,
it becomes nearly impossible to track communications and transactions
conducted between different users and to tie those transactions to any
specific location."
As was pointed out above,5' the problematic geographical nature
of the Internet is coupled with the large and continuously increasing
amount of commerce conducted via the Internet. 2 The potentially
large number of taxable transactions available to states increases the
likelihood of a push toward taxation of on-line commerce." This
push will come both from states in need of revenues 4 and from local
industry no longer happy with the ability of on-line industries to evade
44. A "server" is a provider of space on a computer network that is accessible by others
having access to the Internet. A "web site," or "home page," refers to the actual space provided.
A vendor can place whatever information is desired on its web site. The concept of a web site
generally refers to what is seen on the consumer's computer screen.
45. See Ashraf, supra note 14, at 607.
46. See id. at 608.
47. See Evantheia Schibsted, Net Taxes: States Try to Cash in on On line Commerce, CAL.
LAW. Mar. 1997, at 26.
48. See Gaumer, supra note 42, at 59.
49. "Surfing" is a term commonly used to describe the manner in which an individual
travels from web site to web site. Web sites often provide "links" to other related sites; all an
individual has to do is click a mouse on the link, and the computer will access the intended web
site, which may be physically located on a computer network thousands of miles away from the
one the individual was previously accessing. In this way, the individual can be conceptualized
as floating or "surfing" through a nebulous sea of available information.
50. See Schibsted, supra note 47, at 26.
51. See supra note 4.
52. See Ashraf, supra note 14, at 609.
53. See Schibsted, supra note 47, at 26 (stating that state tax authorities are eager to "tap
into electronic commerce" and providing snippets of interviews with consultants representing both
government and industry).
54. See Grierson, supra note 16, at 615.
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sales tax and sell their goods at lower prices.55 There is some
indication that at least some companies will not mind being subject to
tax if the requirements are uniform and predictable.5 6 At this point
in the debate, the only certain thing is gridlock between states that
desire new ways to raise revenues and industries that resist the
imposition of new taxes outright, or at least that resist a piecemeal
development of Internet tax policy. There will need to be resolution
to be sure, though the current official policy adopts a plan of inac-
tion. 7  The current moratorium expires on October 21, 2001."5 If
it is permitted to expire, a plan will need to be in place to guide the
state taxation that is sure to follow.
III. THREE POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS PERMITTING STATE
TAXATION OF INTERNET COMMERCE
Although there are many ways states could tax Internet commerce,
this Comment addresses only three. 9 First, the purchaser could pay
the sales tax for the jurisdiction where the vendor is located (the"source" model). Second, the Internet vendor could collect and remit
the use tax of the jurisdiction where the purchaser is located (the
"destination" model). Third, federal legislation could preempt any
separate state taxes, establish a uniform tax rate, and give pro rata
refunds to state governments based on each state's share of Internet
consumption.
55. See Another Jurisdiction Issue: Collecting Taxes, 5 COMPUTER L. STRATEGIST 5 (1997)
(discussing the case of Amazon.com, Inc., v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 3466 (JKG)
(S.D.N.Y. amended answer and counterclaim of Amazon.com filed Aug. 15, 1997), describing
litigation between Barnes & Noble, a bookseller with physical stores in most states, and therefore
subject to collection of state sales taxes, and Amazon.com, an on-line bookseller able to avoid state
taxes due to a lack of physical nexus with any state other than its home state of Washington.
This case presents a twist on these issues because Amazon.corn is suing to force Barnes & Noble
to collect sales taxes on all orders placed through Barnes & Noble's web site and sent to states
where Barnes & Noble has a physical presence).
56. See Schibsted, supra note 47, at 27 (quoting Ellen K. Fishbein, assistant general counsel
at America Online: "We're not saying don't tax our industry ... [but] if states are going to tax
us, they need to come up with uniform definitions and tax rates.").
57. See generally Internet Tax Freedom Act, supra note 3. It should be noted, though, that
the Internet Tax Freedom Act does require the formation of a commission to study problems
relating to Internet taxation, including sales and use taxes. Internet Tax Freedom Act,
§ 1102(g)(2)(D)(i).
58. See supra note 5.
59. As a practical matter, while discussion in this Comment is limited to Internet commerce,
any solution adopted would probably be applied to mail-order sales as well because there is no
sound reason to treat the two differently. However, there is a crucial difference in a much broader
context because the Internet extends to a wider variety of activities making any jurisdictional
analysis more significant for Internet activities than for mail-order sales.
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A. Requiring the Purchaser to Pay the Sales Tax of
the Vendor's Jurisdiction
One solution to the problem is to deem all purchases made over
the Internet to have taken place in the vendor's jurisdiction. Returning
to the hypothetical set out above, this would mean that if C ordered
his widget from M2's virtual storefront on the Internet, then the
transaction would be treated in the same manner as if C had physically
gone to M2's actual storefront in State B and made the purchase. This
would be administratively simple for M2 because the sale would be
treated in the same manner as any other sale. M2 would simply collect
the sales tax due on the purchase and remit it to State B.
Of the three models outlined in this paper, a tax of this type
would be the easiest to implement. A vendor could simply state what
the tax rate is in his jurisdiction on the web site itself, and the
consumer could add that cost to the purchase price just as a consumer
now factors in additional shipping and handling charges. Some
commentators refer to this as a source tax because it is calculated at the
source of the merchandise or production.6"
What this method offers in simplicity and ease of administration,
it lacks in overall economic soundness. Sales tax rates for states and
for local tax jurisdictions within states vary widely throughout the
country.61 This does not create any problem in terms of administra-
tion because the consumer will know the rate to which the purchase is
subject at the time the purchase is made. However, this very same
information produces unwanted economic effects.
Using our hypothetical, imagine that C wants to buy a very
expensive widget that costs $1000. Further assume that to have the
object shipped to C there will be added a $25 shipping fee. If State A
is a state like Mississippi with a sales tax of 7.0%,62 the widget will
cost C $1070 (assuming C picks it up from M1 's physical storefront).
If State B is a state like Virginia with a sales tax of 3.5%,63 and C
makes the purchase from M2's web site, then under this tax regime C
60. See William F. Fox & Matthew N. Murray, The Sales Tax and Electronic Commerce:
So What's New?, NAT'L TAx J. (Vol. L No. 3 1997), 573, 574.
61. For example, the State of Mississippi levies a statewide sales tax of 7.0% (MISS. CODE
ANN. § 27-65-17(1) (1998)), whereas Virginia levies a statewide sales tax of 3.5%. (VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-603 (Michie 1997)), and the State of Oregon levies no sales tax at all. Fox, supra
note 2. In addition, because many smaller jurisdictions add an additional amount of sales tax to
the statewide minimum, there are generally minor fluctuations in the applicable sales tax rate
within most states.
62. See supra note 61.
63. Id.
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will pay $1035 for the widget plus an additional $25 for shipping for
a grand total of $1060. We can already see the unfair advantage an
Internet provider enjoys over a local retailer because it is able to avoid
the imposition of C's state sales tax. Add to this State X, which, like
the State of Oregon, imposes no sales tax.64 If C purchases from a
web site of a vendor located in State X, then the total will be $1025
(the $1000 purchase price, on which there is no sales tax, and the
additional shipping charge). If we assume that C is economically
motivated and will purchase the widget at the lowest price, then C and
everyone similarly situated will purchase from the vendor in State X.
The example above demonstrates one of the shifting economic
effects of a source tax: consumers will favor a jurisdiction with the
lowest rate of tax. There is an additional shifting economic effect
based on the same mentality. The vendors themselves will prefer to
locate in a jurisdiction with the lowest rate of tax in order to keep their
own production costs lower.S The result is a shift in the location of
businesses to jurisdictions with low or no sales tax. The long term
result of a source tax system is a distorted economy where states with
lower tax rates receive an inordinately high proportion of the business
from Internet commerce.
By making out-of-state vendors subject to their own jurisdiction's
tax rate, the source tax would take a step toward resolving the inherent
unfairness of the current system that gives all out-of-state Internet
vendors an advantage over local retailers. However, this system creates
a different type of problem. When established Internet vendors
relocate to or new vendors choose to start up in jurisdictions with low
or no sales tax, the same inherent unfairness will result because these
vendors will still be able to undersell some local retailers due to the
substantial tax savings. In addition, a new problem is created for states
that were once home to a piece of the industry because these states lose
the benefits of that industry when it relocates to other states.
In support of a source tax is the argument that the ease of
administration outweighs either of these results because the alternatives
create compliance costs that are too high. In addition, states wishing
to retain Internet vendors will simply have to amend their existing tax
laws to entice that industry. This will create competition amongst the
states as they vie for their share of Internet vendors. Market forces
will likely result in a stabilization of tax rates combined with other
nontax incentives to retain this industry in any given state. The
64. See supra notes 2 and 61.
65. See Fox & Murray, supra note 60, at 576, 586.
1999] 1199
Seattle University Law Review
problem with this economic speculation is that it is merely speculation.
Internet vendors are not likely to want to participate in such a "price
war" because relocation is expensive, and if tax rates were to change
suddenly, then the cost of choosing the wrong location could be high.
This does not offer the industry the kind of predictability it desires.66
In addition to the inability of industry to plan activities, such a system
creates problems for the states themselves because they will not be able
to accurately predict revenues in an unstable tax system.67
B. Requiring the Vendor to Collect and Remit the Use Tax of the
Purchaser's Jurisdiction
Those who are dissatisfied with the source model because of the
problems laid out above may be attracted to a "destination" model.
The destination system makes the Internet vendor responsible for
collecting and remitting the use tax levied by the jurisdiction of the
purchaser.6" This type of system removes the unwanted secondary
economic effects created by a source tax, but instead creates high
compliance costs not associated with a source tax.
The amorphous geographical nature of the Internet makes it
difficult to determine the tax jurisdiction of the purchaser. Given the
mobility of laptop computers and the wide availability of Internet
access, a single individual could access the Internet and purchase an
item from a seemingly endless number of locations.69 Determining
where the consumer is located becomes difficult, if not impossible, from
the vendor's point of view. Proponents of this model often solve the
problem by linking the consumer's tax rate to the jurisdiction to which
the merchandise is shipped, through a billing address or a zip code.70
Even granting the fact that a consumer-on-the-go might actually
make the purchase in a jurisdiction with a sales tax rate different from
that of the jurisdiction to which the merchandise is shipped, this
method of implementing a destination determined Internet sales tax
comes much closer to economic precision. If we examine our
hypothetical, again assuming that C desires to purchase a $1000 widget
and that States A, B, and X have tax rates of 7.0%, 3.5%, and 0%,
respectively, we can see that C's incentive to purchase from State X is
66. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
67. See Adam L. Schwartz, Nexus or Not? Orvis v. New York, SFA Folio v. Tracy and the
Persistent Confusion Over Quill, 29 CONN. L. REV. 485, 487 (1996).
68. See Fox & Murray, supra note 60, at 576.
69. See Scott H. Walters, What Are the Sales Tax Consequences of Retail Marketing on the
Internet?, STATE & LOCAL TAXES WEEKLY, Mar. 24, 1997, at 12.
70. See Fox & Murray, supra note 60, at 587.
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removed. If Internet vendors in all jurisdictions other than those
located in State A are required to collect and remit the use tax levied
by State A, then it will make no difference from whom C makes the
purchase. C will be required to pay a tax of 7.0% from M1, M2, or
the vendor in State X. In addition, C will be charged for shipping if
an order is placed with a vendor in another state. Thus, if C is
economically motivated, under this system C will purchase from M1,
his local retailer.
The destination model makes tax irrelevant to the consumer
because taxes do not produce total cost differences between vendors.
This forces retailers to compete based on the price of their merchandise
and not on the taxes applicable to that merchandise. With such
economic perfection, one may wonder what could possibly be wrong.
The problem becomes obvious when one asks the question, how
will M2 or the vendor in State X know what the tax rate is in C's
jurisdiction? With over 30,000 taxing jurisdictions7 the problem of
compliance with a destination tax places an incredibly large burden on
vendors.72 Some commentators believe that the compliance burden
placed on vendors is not nearly as large as it may seem given the
current and continuing developments in computer software applications
that can be used to keep track of the necessary data.73
Granted, software applications can make compliance easier.
Additionally, few could argue that giant vendors such as L.L. Bean or
Victoria's Secret could not afford to absorb the compliance costs.
These large Internet vendors will be able to develop their own software
or to purchase complex and expensive software permitting them to
comply with a destination tax. However, one of the unique features of
the Internet is its benefit to small-time entrepreneurs doing business
with little capital and attempting to reach the broadest customer base
possible. A small Internet start-up would likely be unable to afford
the computer software necessary to comply with complicated tracking
and computation requirements of a destination tax.74
One author has estimated that a small Internet vendor would have
to earn revenues of $500,000 per year before it could afford the
expense of both the software and the updating services required to stay
71. See Schibsted, supra note 47, at 26.
72. See Fox & Murray, supra note 60, at 586.
73. See Ashraf, supra note 14, at 619. See also Gregory A. Ichel, Internet Sounds Death
Knell for Use Taxes: States Continue to Scream Over Lost Revenues, 27 SETON HALL L. REV.
643, 658-59 (1997).74. See Edward A. Morse, State Taxation of Internet Commerce: Something New Under the
Sun?, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1113, 1142 (1997).
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abreast of the constant changes in tax rates. 7 Estimates like this have
prompted some commentators to propose that an exemption from the
tax be given to vendors with less than a specified amount of reve-
nue. 76  This suggestion, however, undermines the entire purpose of
the destination tax because it removes a large piece of the economic
solution that a destination tax provides.
The purpose of the destination tax is to ameliorate the shifting
economic effects of the current system. A destination tax eliminates
these effects to a much greater extent than does a source tax, but at a
much greater compliance cost. If a safe harbor were provided to
exempt small Internet vendors from the tax, due to compliance costs,
then these vendors would enjoy the benefits of the shifting economic
effects because they could use their tax exemption to undersell local
retailers.
Often the competing local retailers will be small local businesses
as well. These local retailers will therefore receive little protection
from a destination tax that includes a safe harbor provision. Because
the protection of local retailers is one of the primary goals of such
legislation, a safe harbor provision seems counter-productive.
Certainly this analysis does not make the implementation of a
destination tax useless, but it would greatly reduce the effectiveness of
the tax in achieving its economic goals. When this reduction in
effectiveness is coupled with the very high compliance costs associated
with such a tax, and because these costs will be shouldered by those
who are subject to it, the proponents of such a system find themselves
on shaky ground.
C. Federal Legislation of a Uniform Tax Rate
Both of the models presented above have advantages and
drawbacks. A wholehearted acceptance of either must necessarily
embrace both the good and bad associated with it. The source tax
provides such simplicity that most vendors would hardly notice its
implementation but for the increase in the amount of taxes they collect
and remit to their home states; however, while it is fairer than the
current system, it contains a high risk of shifting economic effects that
drastically reduces its overall effectiveness. The destination tax, on the
other hand, if implemented purely, achieves near perfect economic
75. See Steven J. Forte, Use Tax Collection on Internet Purchases: Should the Mail Order
Industry Serve as a Model?, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. LAW 203, 216, n.61 (1997).
76. See Walter Hellerstein, Transaction Taxes and Electronic Commerce: Designing State
Taxes That Work in an Interstate Environment, 50 NAT'L TAX J. 593, 600 (1997).
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effects because the rate of tax paid will always be the same from the
purchaser's standpoint. However, this perfection comes at such a high
compliance cost that it would either stifle the entrepreneurial spirit of
the Internet or require a safe harbor provision. A safe harbor provision
dramatically reduces the system's effectiveness while at the same time
retaining the high compliance cost burden. An optimal system would
attain the economic efficiency of the destination tax, while being as
simple as the source tax. A federally mandated uniform tax rate on all
Internet sales of tangible goods would do just that.
This solution proposes that Congress regulate state taxation of
Internet commerce. Setting a uniform sales tax rate on purchases of
tangible goods over the Internet would greatly reduce the shifting
economic effects of a source tax without creating the high compliance
costs of a destination tax. Under this system, a uniform rate would be
applied to all sales of tangible goods over the Internet. The rate could
be set at the average rate of tax already applied by the states, which is
5.0%." An additional uniform rate could be added to this to repre-
sent the average local sales tax rate.
Applying this system to our hypothetical, and assuming that the
uniform rate is 6.0%, we can see that this system offers a good balance
between the source and destination models. C will still pay a rate of
7.0% on purchases within State A, and the shifting economic effects are
still present if C were to travel to State B (where the rate is 3.5%) or
to State X (where there is no sales tax); however, these effects are
substantially removed if a purchase via the Internet is subject to a rate
of 6.0%. Here C's purchase of a $1000 widget would cost $1070 in
State A, and it would cost $1060 in States B or X, but it would also be
subject to the $25 shipping charge for a grand total of $1085. If C is
economically motivated, then the Internet will not steal any business
away from State A's local retailers.78
Some shifting economic effects will certainly remain under a
system such as this; however, those effects are fewer than if a source
tax system is used. In addition, the simplicity of compliance with a
uniform federal rate reduces compliance costs to such an extent as to
be almost unnoticeable when compared to the huge compliance burden
of a destination tax system.
77. The average sales tax rate levied by the states as of 1994 was just slightly over 5.0%,
the median rate was also 5.0%. Fox, supra note 2, at 4-6.
78. In the facts of this hypothetical, the price of the widget would have to exceed $2500
before the Internet vendors would be able to undercut the local retailer in State A.
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1. Reduction of Vendor's Tendency to Relocate
Although the rate of tax will be uniform and applied at the federal
level, there will still be some variation of actual local tax rates for non-
Internet purchases under this system. Though vendors may still be
tempted to relocate to states with low or no sales tax, because the local
rate of tax will be levied only on items it purchases for its own use,
such as office supplies, this will not affect the decisions of Internet
businesses any more than it will affect any other business. One can
hardly imagine that decisions about where to locate one's business
would hinge on whether sales tax would be paid on pencils and paper
clips.
In addition, the simplicity of one uniform rate will make overall
compliance much easier. Ease of compliance is likely to actually
increase collections. This potential increase in overall collections must
be factored into any equation that focuses on the potential drawbacks
of having a different rate of tax applied to Internet commerce.79
2. Reduction in Tax-Driven Consumer Choices
In addition, Internet vendors' ability to undercut the prices of
local retailers will be greatly reduced. Again, because local rates of
sales tax vary from state to state, there will be some potential for some
tax driven choices if a local rate is higher or lower than the federal rate.
For example, if the national sales tax rate on Internet sales is 5%,
Internet vendors will still enjoy an advantage over a local retailer in a
state where the sales tax is anything above 5%, but Internet vendors
will be placed at a disadvantage with regard to local retailers in states
where the sales tax is below 5%." ° In the aggregate, the differences
will likely be minimal.
While not achieving the economic purity of a destination tax, a
federal uniform tax rate more closely approaches economic parity than
the source tax because the rate can be set to approximate the median
or mean overall sales tax rate, as well as the mean or median rate levied
by smaller jurisdictions such as municipalities or counties. This will
79. See Morse, supra note 74.
80. In the hypothetical, we saw an example of a slight advantage when the local rate of tax
was higher than the uniform rate applied to Internet sales; however, the price of the item would
ordinarily have to be quite high before the Internet vendor is able to overcome the cost of
shipping and able to rely on the lower tax rate to undersell the local competition. See supra notes
77 and 78 and accompanying text. The other side of this problem results in a penalty to the
Internet vendor. In a state like Virginia, where the sales tax is 3.5%, it will be very difficult for
an Internet vendor subject to a 6.0% rate to compete with local retailers.
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create a rate that reflects the combined national average of state and
local sales taxes. Thus, while consumers will not pay the identical rate
they would pay on a local purchase, as they would with a destination
tax, the use of an average rate will ensure that the rate paid will not be
subject to the radical fluctuation in the tax rates that would likely occur
under a source tax regime. Overall, the uniform tax will be less likely
to influence a consumer's choice of vendors.
3. Compliance Cost Burden is Borne Collectively
Though a call for additional government regulation is not often
welcome, Internet commerce probably represents the purest of
interstate activities, making it a prime candidate for federal regulation
pursuant to the Commerce Clause."1 Federal regulation in this area
could solve a number of potential problems; 2 however, the focus of
this Comment is on economic benefits.
Under this proposed uniform tax system, a local vendor need only
be concerned about two rates of tax: the local rate of sales tax, which
must be collected and remitted to the state; and the tax on Internet
sales that will be collected and remitted to the federal body in charge
of collecting and disbursing the tax. This is a dramatic simplification
over the destination tax, which requires each individual vendor to keep
track of the taxing jurisdiction to which every item is shipped,
determine that jurisdiction's rate of tax, collect that tax, and then remit
it to the proper state. The federal solution places on a federal agency
the burden of collecting all of the tax and figuring the amount to be
refunded to each state. Thus, the burden is borne collectively. This
could be done by the Internal Revenue Service or by a new agency
established solely for this purpose.
An additional benefit of a uniform tax is that the federal solution
is just that-a new solution to a new problem. What this solution
avoids is the need to tamper with existing jurisdictional jurisprudence.
The Internet represents a completely new medium that defies our
traditional concept of physical space. However, we must realize that
most of our activities take place in the real world rather than the
virtual world and that a manipulation of due process requirements for
jurisdictional purposes simply to permit taxation under a source or
destination model may have unwanted side-effects. The Due Process
Clause involves a much broader range of issues than just jurisdiction.
81. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the express power "[tio regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
82. See infra, Part Five.
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The jurisprudence associated with this key constitutional clause should
not be altered needlessly, especially when a viable alternative solution
is available.
IV. DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS OF EACH MODEL
A long-standing constitutional muddle was clarified in the Quill
case, which held that the Commerce Clause requires physical presence
in a state before one is subject to that state's tax and that the Due
Process Clause does not have such a requirement.8 3 The previous
section of this Comment posed three possible models for implementing
a tax on Internet commerce once the physical presence requirement is
removed. This section considers how the Due Process Clause affects
each solution.
A. The Evolution of Minimum Contacts and State
Sales and Use Taxes
In the landmark jurisdictional case of Pennoyer v. Neff 4 the
Supreme Court stated that:
The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect
independent, many of the rights and powers [that] originally
belonged to them being now vested in the government created by
the Constitution. . . . [E]xcept as restrained and limited by that
instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent
states.8 5
While these concepts were by no means new in 1877, they highlighted
the tension inherent in our federalist form of government. Not only
is there a separation between federal and state government, but there
are distinct separations between the states themselves, each being an
equal sovereign body. What Pennoyer stated, among other things, was
that a state "possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over
persons and property within its territory" and that "no [s]tate can
exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory. ' 6  While the first proposition remains true,8 7
83. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
84. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
85. Id. at 722.
86. Id.
87. This idea was essentially reaffirmed in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990),
when the Court stated "[a]mong the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in
American tradition is ... . the view developed early that each State had the power to hale before
its courts any individual who could be found within its borders ... no matter how fleeting his
visit." Id. at 610-11.
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the second has been substantially relaxed by the minimum contacts test
first pronounced in International Shoe Co. v. Washington."8
International Shoe addressed the question of a state's power to
exercise jurisdiction over those not present within its physical borders.
Society became much more mobile in the period between 1877, when
Pennoyer was decided, and 1945 when the Court finally promulgated
a test for permitting states to achieve jurisdiction over nonresidents.
However, the minimum contacts test today, much like Pennoyer in
1945, is not a sufficient solution to the current developments involving
the Internet. It is insufficient because the minimum contacts test is
inescapably rooted in notions of state sovereignty and physical space.
In rejecting Pennoyer and announcing its new standard, the Internation-
al Shoe Court stated that:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice." 9
This standard was sufficient to resolve most of the conflicts of the
time, including suits involving tax matters, as in International Shoe.9"
In that case, the defendant had no office in the taxing state, made no
contracts there, and stored no merchandise there, but it did employ
traveling salesmen who solicited orders from customers there.91
These facts bear a striking resemblance to two early state tax cases
decided the year before International Shoe.
Tax cases prior to International Shoe had already held that the
appropriate place to impose a sales tax was where transfer of possession
from vendor to purchaser took place.92 One of the first cases, which
came before the Supreme Court in 1940, dealt with a retail sales tax
levied by New York City on sales of coal within the city limits.93
Berwind-White was a coal company with an office in New York City.
The company arranged contracts for coal mined in Pennsylvania to be
delivered to customers in New York City.94 This seemed clearly to
88. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
89. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
90. This is true in a general sense. To be more precise, International Shoe involved a
dispute over a statute requiring payments into an unemployment compensation fund.
91. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313.
92. See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940); McGoldrick
v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U.S. 70 (1940).
93. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33.
94. Id. at 44.
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be a transaction involving interstate commerce, yet the Court reasoned
that the imposition of the tax was not an undue burden on interstate
commerce. 95  Even though the imposition of the tax caused an
increase in the price of Berwind-White's coal, the Court held that it
did not discriminate against interstate commerce but rather was merely
an equalizer because every merchant within the city was also subject
to the tax." The notion of laying the tax at the place of destination
was a major theme to emerge from the case.97 The Court reasoned
that this tax was permissible because it was levied on "a local activity,"
which was the act of delivering "the goods within the state upon their
purchase for consumption.""8
In one sense it seems somewhat arbitrary to classify delivery at the
final place of sale as purely local because the classification merely taxes
the endpoint of an otherwise interstate activity. It would seem to be
equally logical to classify the other end of the journey, the point of
shipment, as the taxable event.99 This possibility of multiple taxation
events during an interstate shipment of goods was one of the main
hurdles the Court had to overcome in these early cases. If two or more
states levy taxes on interstate shipments, a severe burden is placed on
interstate commerce, resulting in the exact impediment the Commerce
Clause was designed to avoid.1"'
In a case decided at the same time as Berwind-White, the Court
added to the analysis more language that seemed to remove much of
the risk of multiple taxation. In McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant
Manufacturing Co.,0 1 the Court followed the Berwind-White holding
that the place of destination was the proper taxing jurisdiction, but
further justified it as the correct location for imposition of the tax
because the "transfer of possession" from the seller to the purchaser
took place there.0 2 Thus, these two early decisions stood for the
proposition that the place of destination was the appropriate place to
levy a sales tax when that location was also the place where the
95. Id. at 46 (citing Western Live Stock v. Bureau, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)) ("[lIt was not
the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce of their just
share of state tax burdens, merely because an incidental or consequential effect of the tax is an
increase in the cost of doing business.").
96. Id. at 49.
97. See HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 586.
98. Benvind-White Coal Mining, 309 U.S. at 58.
99. See HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 585.
100. See id. at 586.
101. 309 U.S. 70 (1940).
102. Id. at 77.
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ultimate transfer of the product from the seller to the purchaser
occurred.
This is a sound rule and a very familiar one. If we return to the
hypothetical set out above, we can see that this essentially covers all of
the situations in which C physically meets with either M1 or M2 and
makes a purchase. At either point, C will be subject to the sales tax
of the jurisdiction where C is physically located. In both cases, these
are "local" transactions in the sense of Berwind- White, even though the
product C purchases may well be one that traveled in interstate
commerce. In both cases, State A and State B are able to force the
merchant to collect the tax and remit it to the state just as New York
City required in Berwind- White.103 At this point in the Court's
analysis, there was little to indicate whether it was the Commerce or
Due Process Clause that compelled this result.
Berwind-White and Felt & Tarrant were jurisdictionally sound
under Pennoyer because both parties were physically within the
jurisdiction when the tax was levied. Thus one might conclude that
the Due Process Clause was all that was necessary to reach these
decisions. However, the notion of physical presence was not seriously
examined or tested until McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co.'°4 and General
Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission of Iowa' were decided. In
each of these cases, the vendor was a nonresident whose only presence
in the taxing state was embodied by its traveling salesmen. In both
cases, elements of the Commerce Clause began to creep into the
analysis.
In Dilworth, the State of Arkansas sought to levy a sales tax on
several out-of-state companies with home offices in Tennessee but no
offices in Arkansas. They were not qualified to do business in
Arkansas, but did have traveling salesmen soliciting orders there. 10 6
The orders were sent to the offices in Tennessee for approval, were
accepted in Tennessee, and the goods were shipped via common carrier
from Tennessee. 1 7  The Court differentiated the situation in this
case from that in Berwind-White, stating that in Berwind-White the
entire transaction took place within New York City, whereas in
Dilworth the seller was "[done] selling in Tennessee .. .under these
circumstances the sale-the transfer of ownership-was made in
103. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. at 43.
104. 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
105. 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
106. Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 328.
107. Id.
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Tennessee." ''  The Court held that Arkansas' attempt to levy a
sales tax on these transactions was an "assumption of power by a State
[that] the Commerce Clause was meant to end."' °9
The Court then went on to differentiate a sales tax from a use tax,
stating that while the two different types of tax will often achieve the
same result, they are fundamentally different in that a use tax in this
situation would be permissible but a sales tax would not."' Justice
Frankfurter drew the distinction between the two types of tax as a
distinction between the different types of transactions upon which they
are levied."' The fundamental difference is that a sales tax "is a tax
on the freedom of purchase," ' whereas a use tax "is a tax on the
enjoyment of that which was purchased."'1 The Court reasoned
that the imposition of a sales tax on a company located in another state
was an exercise of power extending too far beyond the state's borders,
but that a use tax was levied on the use of a product within the state
and was therefore permissible in situations when a sales tax was
not." ' Thus, had Arkansas simply called its tax a use tax, it might
have been able to force J.E. Dilworth to collect and remit it.
The Court had previously upheld the validity of a compensating
use tax 15 based on a similar distinction, stating that a use tax "is not
upon the operations of interstate commerce, but upon the privilege of
use after commerce is at an end."1'6 With this distinction, even in
its reiteration in Dilworth, the Court did not address anything further
than the mere validity of such a tax. Because the references to the use
tax were merely dicta in Dilworth, one might have been left to ponder
the true question with which the states were concerned: to what extent
could states force the out-of-state seller to collect the state's use tax
from the purchaser and remit it to the consumer's state of residence?
Given the difficulty of collecting use taxes, this was the real question
states wanted answered.
That answer came in General Trading when the Court held that
the State of Iowa could compel a Minnesota company to collect and
remit a use tax on sales made in Iowa by traveling salesmen employed
108. Id. at 330.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 330-31.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 330.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 331.
115. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
116. Id. at 582.
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by a Minnesota company." 7 General Trading Co. had no offices in
Iowa, had never qualified to do business in Iowa, and its orders were
sent back to Minnesota for approval and shipping.11 The Court in
General Trading relied on the Iowa Supreme Court's interpretation of
its use tax, which held that General Trading Co. was a "retailer
maintaining a place of business in th[e] state."1"9 Based on this
interpretation, the Court upheld the tax.12 1 Thus, it appeared that,
if only by accident, Iowa had succeeded where Arkansas had mistaken-
ly relied on a sales rather than a use tax. As a result, all a state had to
do was enact a use tax statute and it would be able to reach out-of-
state vendors doing business within its borders.
The Constitutional foundation on which these cases rested was
unclear. Though both Dilworth and General Trading were decided a
year prior to International Shoe, these two decisions made sense within
the minimum contacts scheme, the basic tenets of which were surely
on the minds of the Justices in 1944. In International Shoe, the Court
stated that, to the extent one has minimum contacts with the forum
state, those contacts may give rise to corresponding obligations, and
that "so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the
activities within the state, a procedure that requires the corporation to
respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances,
hardly be said to be undue.''. Looking to the type of contacts in
Dilworth and General Trading and comparing them with the obligations
sought to be enforced, the results of those cases do not seem paradoxi-
cal.
In Dilworth, traveling salesmen solicited orders within the taxing
state; however, the obligation sought to be enforced was collection and
remittance of a sales tax. 22 The Court had already decided that a
sales tax was appropriately levied where transfer of possession from
vendor to purchaser took place. 123 In Dilworth, this transfer occurred
out-of-state, and thus not even the minimum contacts test could reach
the transaction. In General Trading, the contacts with the state were
the same; however, the obligation sought to be enforced was entirely
117. General Trading, 322 U.S. at 338.
118. Id. at 337.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
122. Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 328.
123. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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different. 124  A use tax statute simply appoints the out-of-state
vendor as an agent for the collection and remittance of the use tax
otherwise owed by the consumers. In General Trading, the salesmen
had contacts with the consumers, and the appointment as surrogate tax
collector was certainly related to those activities. Thus, the use tax as
applied to an out-of-state vendor comports with due process, while a
sales tax as applied to that same vendor does not.
The interesting question is why the Commerce Clause was relied
upon in both Dilworth and General Trading when the Due Process
Clause was sufficient to'resolve the issues. The Commerce Clause was
specifically relied upon in Dilworth as a block to the sales tax, 125
while the Supreme Court of Iowa's interpretation of its use tax
emphasized the maintenance of a "place of business" within the state
as a justification for the use tax.126 Because the Due Process Clause
was sufficient to address the problem in its entirety, it is unclear why
the Commerce Clause and thus, the physical presence requirement,
crept into the analysis. The minimum contacts test would not be
announced for another year, and this confusion might be the result of
the Court's thoughts on the subject still being in a nebulous state.
Whatever the reason, the presence of the Commerce Clause in the
analysis would cause great difficulty in the following years.
The Court also struggled with variations on the Dilworth and
General Trading facts. In Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,127 the
Court held that Iowa could properly require Sears to collect the state's
use tax on sales made solely through its catalogues to Iowa consum-
ers. 128 In this case, Sears also maintained twelve retail stores within
Iowa, 129 and it argued that there was no "local activity ... which
generate[d] or which relate[d] to the mail orders."'30 The Court
rejected this argument and held that the mail order sales were "not
unrelated to [Sears'] course of business in Iowa.. . . Hence to include
them in the global amount of benefits [that Sears] is receiving from
Iowa business is to conform to business facts."'' Thus, a company
cannot avoid being appointed as a tax collecting agent for the state by
124. In General Trading, the state imposed a use tax. See supra note 117 and accompanying
text.
125. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
127. 312 U.S. 359.
128. Nelson, 312 U.S. at 366.
129. Id. at 362 n.3.
130. Id. at 364.
131. Id.
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simply bifurcating its business into one business that has physical
offices and one that does not. 132
Another unsuccessful attempt to avoid use tax collection liability
involved a modification of the General Trading facts. In Scripto, Inc.
v. Carson, 33 a Georgia corporation was required to collect and remit
Florida's use tax on sales made to Florida customers that had been
solicited on behalf of Scripto by independent contractors operating
within the state of Florida. 134 The Court found the distinction
between the full-time traveling salesmen in General Trading and the
part-time independent contractors in Scripto to be immaterial. 3 5
The Court instead saw the employment of ten part-time independent
contractors as constituting a sufficient "continuous local solicita-
tion"'36 that gave Scripto a sufficient nexus with Florida to make it
liable for collecting Florida's use tax.
The cases in the wake of International Shoe addressed the issue of
how minimal the contacts with a state could be while still supporting
jurisdiction. It seemed clear that not just any contact with the forum
state would do. The limit was tested in the state tax area in Miller
Bros. Co. v. Maryland,'37 in which the appellant was a retailer with
a store in Wilmington, Delaware, that advertised in local newspapers
and on local radio stations. 8 Appellant was not qualified to do
business in Maryland, but its advertisements reached Maryland
customers and sales were made to Maryland residents, often requiring
delivery of the merchandise to their homes within the State of
Maryland.'39 Additionally, the store often mailed supplemental fliers
to former customers, which included Maryland residents. 4 °
The State of Maryland attempted to force Miller Brothers to
collect and remit the Maryland use tax on all of the merchandise
delivered to addresses within its boundaries.' 4 ' The Court decided
the case on Due Process grounds, noting that for Maryland to be able
to subject a resident of Delaware to its taxing jurisdiction there must
be a "definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the
132. Nelson, 312 U.S. 359. See also National Geographic Soc'y v. California Equalization
Bd., 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
133. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
134. Id. at 211.
135. Id. at 212.
136. Id. at 211.
137. 347 U.S. 340.
138. Id. at 341-42.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 342.
141. Id.
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person, property or transaction it seeks to tax." 14 2 The Court failed
to find a sufficient connection, noting specifically that there was "a
wide gulf' between the "active and aggressive" solicitation by the
traveling salesmen in General Trading and the "occasional delivery of
goods sold at an out-of-state store with no solicitation other than the
incidental effects of general advertising" in Miller Bros.'43
The existence of a "wide gulf' between having employees or
independent contractors soliciting orders in a state and simply mailing
fliers into a state and delivering merchandise may seem both obvious
and insignificant. A company deriving profits from customers located
in another state certainly would be able to use that state's courts to
enforce its contracts with that state's residents. Yet, on the other hand,
contact solely by mail seems very casual and lacks the "active and
aggressive" characteristics the Court seemed to find important in the
General Trading and Scripto facts. Where the edges of the "wide gulf'
were and what it might take to bridge it were open and confusing
questions.
The Court attempted an answer in Hanson v. Denckla1" when
it added the concept of purposeful availment to the body of Due
Process law. In Hanson, a woman executed a trust agreement with a
Delaware trust company and later moved to Florida where she passed
away.'45 Though the decedent had had minor contact with the
trustee while domiciled in Florida,'46 the Court found that the trustee
could not be subjected to the laws of Florida because "[t]he unilateral
activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident
defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
State."' 4 7 The Florida courts had no jurisdiction over the Delaware
trustee because the trustee had done nothing of its own volition to
bring itself under the laws of Florida.'48
Purposeful availment speaks to the reasonableness of subjecting an
individual to a distant forum. This reasonableness was one of the
fundamental concerns of the Court in International Shoe when it spoke
of "fair play and substantial justice."' 49  The contacts a corporation
has with a state must be such that it is "reasonable ... to require the
142. Id. at 344-45.
143. Id. at 346-47.
144. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
145. Id. at 238-39.
146. Id. at 252.
147. Id. at 253.
148. Id. at 254.
149. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
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corporation to defend the particular suit [that] is brought there."'sq
These notions of reasonableness and purposeful availment require that
a party play a part in the activities that result in it being subjected to
a state's jurisdiction. However, these nebulous standards become
largely meaningless for Internet vendors and consumers whose
activities take place in cyberspace, which bears no correlation to
physical geography.
This was the state of the law when Bellas Hess came before the
Court. In Bellas Hess, the Court ultimately decided that mail order
sales were not taxable in either the vendor's or purchaser's jurisdiction,
unless both happened to be in the same jurisdiction. This result was
reaffirmed in Quill except that the roles of the Due Process and
Commerce Clauses were clarified. In Quill, the Court stated that there
were sufficient minimum contacts due to the direct solicitation in the
form of the catalogues.' Thus, if the physical presence requirement
were removed, then the mail order vendor would be charged with
collecting and remitting the use tax required by the purchaser's
jurisdiction.'
Thus, to adopt the same rationale for Internet sales, the Internet
vendor must be deemed to be doing business in any state where it
makes a sale. This would result in a destination tax model. However,
the Internet does not lend itself to a destination tax model analysis as
easily as mail-order sales because an Internet vendor simply makes its
web page available, while it is the consumer who must go out and find
it. Consequently, there is far less purposeful availment on the part of
the Internet vendor as compared to the mail order vendor. Under
either a source or destination model, one of the parties can argue that
the tax is unconstitutional as applied to him or her. The resulting
gridlock prompts the adoption of a uniform tax as a solution; however,
a uniform tax has many problems of its own. Regardless of the model
adopted, it must be acceptable under the Due Process Clause.
B. Due Process and the Source Tax Model
Under the source tax model, the consumer pays the sales tax of
the jurisdiction where the vendor is located. Thus, for tax purposes,
the consumer becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the vendor's state,
150. Id. at 317.
151. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308.
152. This is not a sales tax because the sale is deemed to take place where the transfer of
possession from vendor to vendee takes place, which is the point where the merchandise is placed
in the mail. See Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330.
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even though the consumer is not physically present in that jurisdiction.
However, under the minimum contacts test, one need not be physically
present in a particular jurisdiction. It can be argued that the consumer
has purposefully availed himself of the "privilege of conducting
activities within the [Internet vendor's] State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws."' 53  The consumer could, after
all, use the courts of the vendor's state to bring an action for products
liability, breach of implied warranty, or any manner of other claims
that might arise out of the purchase of a product. However, the proper
question in this case is whether the consumer could be sued in the
taxing state. The answer is far from clear.
It is not difficult to argue that placing an order is a business
activity and that, because the vendor's web page is on a local server,
the business activity is conducted within the vendor's taxing jurisdic-
tion. However, the minimum contacts test requires the contacts to be
such that it is "reasonable ... to require the [consumer] to defend the
particular suit which is brought" in the taxing state.'54 Would it be
reasonable to require a consumer to defend a lawsuit over tax collection
for the purchase of one single item from a distant jurisdiction? The
answer is unclear, and litigation may be required to define the
parameters of the minimum contacts test as applied to Internet
transactions.
These parameters are already being defined in nontax contexts.
In Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,' the defendant operated a web page
in New Jersey that offered network and legal services to law firms
under the name "ESQWIRE.COM."'' 6  Plaintiff, owner of Esquire
magazine and a New York corporation, sued for trademark infringe-
ment in New York based on the defendant's use of the name
"Esqwire" for his web site." 7 At the time of the suit, the defen-
dant's web site was not fully operational and no products had been
sold to New York residents, though the web site had been visited by
many New Yorkers."5 8 The court held that New York did not have
personal jurisdiction over the defendant and that the web site was akin
to an advertisement in a national publication and did not constitute
sufficient business within the state to support jurisdiction.'59 How-
153. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
154. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
155. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
156. Id. at *1-*2.
157. Id. at *1.
158. Id. at l, *14.
159. Id. at *37.
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ever, the court did hint that had defendant contracted to sell his
services to a New York consumer, New York likely would have had
jurisdiction over him.160
A contract of the type that the court hinted at in Hearst was
present in CompuServe, Inc. v Patterson,161 in which the Sixth Circuit
found personal jurisdiction in Ohio over a Texas defendant whose
contacts with the Ohio-based plaintiff were entirely through the
Internet.'62 In Patterson, the contacts were very extensive, lasted
over a three-year period, and included the execution of an agreement
that any disputes arising out of the business arrangements would be
settled according to Ohio law.' 63  These contacts are much more
extreme than the casual contacts an individual consumer would have
with an Internet vendor when the consumer makes a single purchase
and has no further contact. As a result of the diverse uses to which
the Internet is put, courts have struggled to construct uniform rules to
guide the application of the minimum contacts test to Internet
commerce.
One issue that many courts have agreed on is that a "passive" web
site, that is, a web site that is the functional equivalent of an advertise-
ment because it is not interactive between vendor and purchaser,
confines jurisdiction to the vendor's location.'64 Courts addressing
this issue have generally held that merely creating a web site cannot
result in jurisdiction because, "like placing a product into the stream
of commerce, [a web site] may be felt nationwide--or even world-
wide-but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward
the forum state.' '1 65
Thus, there is essentially a continuum that begins with passive
web sites that confer no jurisdiction'6 6 and ends with interactive web
sites with a long history of conducting commercial transactions. 67
Between these two extremes are all other web sites, those with perhaps
160. Id. at *36.
161. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
162. Id. at 1260.
163. Id. at 1260-61.
164. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997); Cybersell, Inc.
v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997); Edberg v. Neogen Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 104
(D. Conn. 1998); Mallinckrodt Medical, Inc. v. Sonus Pharm., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 265 (D.D.C.
1998).
165. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 418 (quoting Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301) (which cited the
plurality opinion in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112, 107 S. Ct.
1026, 1032, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92, 104 (1992)).
166. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
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minimal interstate activity, or with a minimal history of activity
connected to a particular forum. In this vast middle ground, line
drawing becomes difficult and "the likelihood that personal jurisdiction
can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature
and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the
Internet."' 68  This results in ambiguities that are unacceptable in a
taxing scheme because there is no meaningful standard on which a
vendor can rely.
Vendors might avoid this interpretive problem by placing
disclaimers on their web sites stating that "by placing an order you
consent to the jurisdiction of State X." These clauses may be
enforceable in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz'69 and Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute.7 '
However, these clauses do not clearly provide a solid jurisdictional
basis.'71  Although the forum selection clause was enforced in
Carnival Cruise Lines, the Court acknowledged that, when the
occurrence giving rise to the claim is purely local in nature or when the
imposition of the forum selection clause results in "serious inconve-
nience," the clause may be avoided.'72
One problem with the source tax is that it poses many novel
questions that must be resolved before the state of the law would be
stable. One of the key components of any tax scheme is its predict-
ability. A source tax is certain to result in litigation by consumers who
will argue that it is unconstitutional to characterize a transaction as
taking place in the vendor's jurisdiction. While these issues would
eventually be resolved, it should be noted that nearly fifty years passed
between Dilworth and Quill. Given the rapid growth of the Internet,
168. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
169. 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (holding that Florida could exercise jurisdiction over a defendant
residing in Michigan who had breached a contract containing a forum selection clause that
required Florida law to govern and stated that the contractual relationship had been created in
Florida).
170. 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (holding that enforcement of a forum selection clause requiring
all actions to be pursued in Florida courts was proper when it was printed on the tickets (which
were received only after they had been purchased) even though it was shown that the plaintiffs,
who resided in Washington State, were financially incapable of litigating in Florida). In Burger
King, the defendant was a sophisticated business man, but in Carnival Cruise Lines the plaintiffs
were not, and in fact, the plaintiffs were likely to have been totally unaware of the forum selection
clause until long after the injury occurred. Clauses such as these would be helpful to Internet
vendors because they would require all suits to be conducted in the vendors' local courts.
171. See Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (where the
Texas court not only subjected a California corporation to jurisdiction in Texas, but refused to
enforce the contract on the corporation's web site, which contained an arbitration clause
requiring arbitration in California).
172. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 592.
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a lengthy delay in resolution of this issue would result in great revenue
losses to the states. 173
C. Due Process and the Destination Tax Model
Under the destination tax model, the vendor becomes a surrogate
tax collector for the consumer's jurisdiction. The vendor is thus
charged with collecting and remitting that jurisdiction's use tax from
the consumer. This model falls prey to the same arguments as the
source model, except that it is the vendor who is entitled to complain.
In General Trading, similar collection obligations were upheld, but in
that case, agents of the vendor were physically present within the
taxing state.'74  This "continuous local solicitation"'75 is what the
Court found to be significant. Once Quill separated the physical
presence requirement from the Due Process Clause, it became possible
to construe the notion of "continuous local solicitation" so broadly as
to encompass solicitations via the Internet.
It is tempting to conclude that a vendor's use of the Internet is
like placing an advertisement in every local newspaper in the nation
and that such use is precisely the kind of "solicitation" the Court had
in mind. However, in Miller Bros. the Court found that an "occasional
delivery of goods sold at an out-of-state store with no solicitation other
than the incidental effects of general advertising" was insufficient to
support an assertion of jurisdiction by the consumer's state.'76
Furthermore, many courts have already rejected a grant of jurisdiction
based on an advertising analogy.'77 Again, one confronts the wide
gulf between the aggressive solicitation of business sufficient to support
jurisdiction in Quill,'78 and the passive advertising in Miller Bros.
There are certainly Internet vendors at both ends of the spec-
trum-some more like Quill Corporation and others more like Miller
Brothers. To tax those who are similar to Quill and to permit those
who are like Miller Brothers to avoid the tax is inequitable and requires
arbitrary line drawing between large and small vendors. For the large
scale Internet vendor, the web page is very much like placing an
advertisement in every local newspaper in the country, and presumably
173. See supra note 4 for estimates concerning the growth of Internet commerce.
174. General Trading, 322 U.S. at 337.
175. Scripto, 362 U.S. at 211.
176. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 347.
177. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
178. In Quill, the Court held that the Due Process requirements were satisfied and that,
absent the physical presence requirement, jurisdiction would have been proper based on the
substantial contacts Quill Corporation had with North Dakota residents. Quill, 504 U.S. 298.
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the effect of both would be similar because both would result in the
solicitation of many customers from many jurisdictions. However, the
small Internet vendor who might make a sale or two in many
jurisdictions scattered throughout the nation is more analogous to a
shop owner with a billboard visible to consumers passing by on the
information super-highway-more like the "general" advertising of
Miller Bros.
While it is certainly foreseeable, even to the small Internet vendor,
that its products may be purchased in any reachable jurisdiction, the
Court has held that "'foreseeability' alone has never been a sufficient
benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process
Clause."' 79  Rather, the Court has stated "[the benchmark] is that
the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum [s]tate [is] such
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."' 8 °
The issue becomes then, whether the decision to make a sale is
sufficient to subject a merchant to the jurisdiction to which the product
is shipped.
If a vendor does not want to risk being haled into court in a
particular jurisdiction, the vendor need only refuse to fill orders that
require shipment to that location. This argument creates a standard
whereby a sale to any one jurisdiction would constitute the appropriate
minimum contacts for the due process prong of the nexus requirement.
However, a single sale seems to fall on the Miller Bros. side of the wide
gulf between aggressive and passive contacts, making a resulting suit
unreasonable. In reality, the single sale example represents an extreme
situation. Most vendors fall somewhere between a single contact and
thousands of contacts. The problem is to determine where to draw the
line. Those on the Quill side of the line will be subject to tax while
those on the Miller Bros. side will not. 181
Thus, like the source tax, the destination tax creates a state of
confusion. If the physical presence requirement of the Commerce
Clause is removed, then the imposition of a destination tax results in
a model that is both difficult to apply and to enforce. Internet vendors
will probably resist the imposition of the tax due to the high compli-
ance costs associated with it.' 2 As with the source tax, the possibili-
179. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
180. Id. at 297.
181. See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (holding that
defendant's 131 contacts with Missouri residents via electronic mail for the purposes of
distributing information targeted to each potential customer's needs was sufficient contact to
support personal jurisdiction in Missouri).
182. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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ty of successful implementation exists. However, prior to the
resolution of the critical issues, the destination tax model contains the
same instability and unpredictability as the source tax model.
D. Due Process and a Uniform Federal Tax Rate
The difficulties involving the Due Process Clause in connection
with a source or destination tax occur when one state attempts to gain
jurisdiction over residents of another state. The taxing state can no
longer rest on the settled jurisdictional principles of Pennoyer'83 and
must demonstrate that the individual or entity has the requisite
contacts with the taxing state to support that forum's jurisdiction. For
jurisdiction to be proper, the location of the contacts must correspond
to the geographical boundaries of the body asserting jurisdiction.
Attempts to correlate activities conducted in cyberspace with locations
in physical space result in the confusion demonstrated by the source
and destination tax models.
A uniform tax rate applied at the federal level and administered
through a federal body could avoid the jurisdictional problems of the
source or destination tax models because an interpretation of Due
Process law would not be required. Federal legislation could fully
occupy the area of Internet taxation based on the status of Internet
commerce as interstate commerce. 18 4 Because everyone is subject to
federal legislation, under this system there are no issues surrounding
one state's assertion of power over the residents of another. Thus, due
process issues will not arise.
While this approach has no jurisdictional complexities, other
problems make it equally, if not more, difficult to implement than the
source or destination tax. As outlined above, economic problems arise
from the variation between the uniform rate and the tax rate of
particular jurisdictions,' though one can perhaps argue that the
uniform tax solution provides a happy medium between the source and
destination models. While some shifting economic effects remain, they
are minimized and there is no support for a safe harbor provision of
the type that would undermine the destination model.
Even more problematic, however, are the administrative difficul-
ties of implementing and managing such a system. While the
compliance and administrative costs will be borne collectively, it is
183. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
184. In effect, this has already occurred as a result of the moratorium created by the
Internet Tax Freedom Act. See supra note 3.
185. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
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possible that the massive federal bureaucracy required to implement
and manage the collection and redistribution will result in higher
overall costs.
V. MECHANICS AND FURTHER ADVANTAGES
OF A FEDERAL SOLUTION
As demonstrated, both the source tax and destination tax have
economic, administrative, and compliance advantages and disadvantag-
es 18 6 as well as potential controversies when applied under the Due
Process Clause."8 7 A federal uniform sales tax on Internet sales will
combine the best of both the source and destination models while
avoiding the potential due process complications of either solution.
A. Mechanics of the Soiution
The federal sales tax rate would be set at the average rate of sales
tax for the states with an additional rate added to represent the average
sales tax charged by local jurisdictions within the states. The use of
this rate of tax, while not eliminating tax-influenced decision making,
would come quite close to the destination tax model in terms of
economic effects.' It would also result in compliance costs similar
to the source tax because Internet vendors would not have to keep
track of thousands of taxing jurisdictions. They would need to keep
track of only two: their own local jurisdictions and the rate for
Internet sales.8 9 This solution essentially creates a new cybertax
jurisdiction, with one tax rate governed by a federal administrative
agency.
The federal agency regulating the collection would then deduct the
collection costs from the revenue collected and distribute the remaining
moneys back to the states in amounts proportionate to each state's
share of total Internet consumption. Thus, states would be able to
collect amounts equal to their use taxes. In addition, moneys collected
from international purchasers could be set aside and distributed to the
states based on each state's percentage of international sales, thus also
permitting a sales tax to be applied to international transactions.
The details of calculation, as well as the definition of what is
included in the Internet tax base must be worked out, but these details
186. See supra Part III.A-B.
187. See supra Part IV.B-C.
188. See supra Part III.C.2 for further discussion of the economics of this model.
189. See supra Part III.C.2 for further discussion.
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are beyond the scope of this Comment. 9 ' While the number of
calculations that a federally run agency using this system would be
required to do would certainly be great, this system is nevertheless
advantageous because the costs would be incurred only once and would
be uniform throughout the states. As the system develops, collection
and remittance of Internet taxes would become much more efficient
than fifty separate state collection methods could ever hope to be.
B. Further Advantages
Beyond the simplicity of central collection and the combination of
economic benefits of a uniform federal tax rate, there are several other
advantages to a federal system. A federal system will recognize
overriding federal interests in the Internet; it will directly address the
development of and the United States' participation in the intercon-
nected world of global commerce; and, it will permit the comprehen-
sive development of international agreements that recognize the need
for international enforcement of Internet tax laws.
1. Overriding Federal Interests
The framers of the Constitution recognized the potential
commercial problems associated with a federalist form of government.
That concern is reflected in the Commerce Clause, which gives plenary
power to Congress to regulate commerce among the several states.1 91
In order to have a productive national economy, trade must be able to
flow among the states free from undue burdens placed upon it by any
one state. The opinions of the Supreme Court are replete with this
concept and hold that "[t]he very purpose of the Commerce Clause [is]
to create an area of free trade among the several States."' 92
The nature of the Internet makes correlation of transactions in
cyberspace with geographical points in physical space nearly impossi-
ble.19a While commerce is certainly being conducted between states,
the application of traditional jurisdictional concepts is difficult at best
because of the unbroken process of Internet communication. Thus, the
190. For the details of a plan similar to this one, see Kendall L. Houghton, How Do We
Impose and Collect Sales and Use Taxes on Electronic Commerce? An Analysis of Three Substantive
Suggestions, 1997 COMM. ON STATE TAXATION 21.
191. For the text of the Commerce Clause, see supra note 81.
192. Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330.
193. See Hellerstein, supra note 76, at 597 (stating that "[tlraditional approaches to the
nexus question appear to be doomed to failure in the context of taxation of electronic commerce.
To ask about the 'location' of electronic commerce .. .is to ask a question that is not worth
answering.").
1999] 1223
Seattle University Law Review
Internet is the quintessential vehicle of interstate commerce. Only the
federal government can properly tax transactions occurring within that"cyberjurisdiction. '194  A federal tax scheme would also facilitate the
resolution of other truly national concerns, such as the development of
global commerce and enforcement of taxes throughout the international
community."19
2. Participation in Global Commerce
The notion that the growth and development of the Internet has
made the world a smaller place seems almost an understatement, and
the outlook for the growth and development of global commerce
through the Internet has prompted some bold statements.
We are on the verge of a revolution that is just as profound as the
change in the economy that came with the industrial revolution.
Soon electronic networks will allow people to transcend the barriers
of time and distance and take advantage of global markets and
business opportunities not even imaginable today, opening up a new
world of economic possibility and progress. 96
In recognizing the global nature of Internet commerce, the current
administration has called for the development of a policy that will be
integrated into a comprehensive international plan to enable any
Internet taxation to meet three goals. The tax should:
[1]. neither distort nor hinder commerce, such as by discriminating
among types of commerce or creating incentives that change
the nature or location of transactions;
[2]. be simple and transparent, with minimal recordkeeping
requirements and easy implementation; and
[3]. be consistent with tax systems used by the United States and
its trading partners today.197
194. See Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 331 (where the Court, in speaking of the Commerce Clause
and interstate transactions, states: "That clause vested the power of taxing a transaction forming
an unbroken process of interstate commerce in the Congress, not in the States.").
195. See Internet Tax Freedom Act, supra note 3. During the pendency of the moratorium
on new Internet taxes, the Act created the Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce. One
of the issues to be studied by the Commission is the effect that the collection of consumption
taxes in the United States and other countries will have "on the global economy, including an
examination of the relationship between the collection and administration of such taxes when the
transaction uses the Internet and when it does not." Id. at § l102(g)(2)(B).
196. Vice President Albert Gore Jr., quoted in White House Report "A Framework For
Global Electronic Commerce" Together with Background Paper, 127 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) L-13
(July 2, 1997).
197. Electronic Commerce: Clinton Unveils Report Advocating National, Global Harmony on
Internet Taxes, 127 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) GG-1 (July 2, 1997).
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Whether these goals can be met effectively is a separate issue. The
position advocated by this Comment is that these are the appropriate
goals and that the federal government is the only body that can
effectively achieve these goals.
The issues surrounding the Internet, like the issues surrounding
the Due Process Clause, are not confined to taxation. Policy in this
area must be delivered by a body with the authority to resolve all of
the issues and not merely the tax issues. The federal government alone
has the power to enter into international agreements; 198 therefore, the
federal government must lead the development and resolution of policy
issues related to the Internet.'99 Given the muddling uncertainty of
source and use taxes, both in terms of economic effects and due
process concerns, state forays into this area might create problems due
to the questionable state of the law. When the participation of
international vendors is added to the calculus of Internet taxation, the
resulting complexity makes it difficult to justify the imposition of state
tax policy in this area.
3. International Enforcement
Controversy over tax liability is certain to grow as Internet
vendors are subjected to taxes. Due to the global reach of the Internet,
these controversies are certain to involve both domestic and interna-
tional taxpayers. A uniform tax rate and regulations governed by a
central federal body would result in a more efficient adjudication of
claims. Administrative proceedings would be standardized, and
international taxpayers would be familiar with collection procedures
and dispute resolution procedures for any and all Internet transactions
conducted throughout the United States.
A federally implemented uniform tax rate thus has a significant
advantage over individually developed and implemented state systems.
A state may bring an action for collection of taxes against a foreign
198. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1 denies the states this power by stating "[n]o State shall
enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation." The Constitution then grants this power to
the President with approval of the Senate required: "[The President] shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur." U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
199. This sentiment is echoed in the Internet Tax Freedom Act's declaration that "[i]t is
the sense of Congress that the President should seek bilateral, regional, and multilateral
agreements to remove barriers to global electronic commerce through the World Trade
Organization, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Trans-Atlantic
Economic Partnership, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the Free Trade Area of the
Americas, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and other appropriate venues." Internet
Tax Freedom Act, supra note 3, at § 1203(a).
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taxpayer within the current framework of the law, but the efficiency of
a federally administered system would benefit both the states and
international taxpayers. States would not have to spend their resources
collecting taxes directly. While the overall collection burden would be
shared by all the states, the overall cost is likely to be lower due to the
need to maintain only one administrative organization. Taxpayers
would need to familiarize themselves with the procedures of only one
organization rather than fifty separate ones.
Furthermore, because international tax agreements governing the
Internet are imminent, it would make no sense for the federal
government to negotiate the arrangements, which it is constitutionally
compelled to do, then hand over the enforcement duties to the
individual states. Uniformity has become the shibboleth of Internet
tax discussions and such uniformity in enforcement can hardly develop
if left to the states. While there are calls among state organizations for
uniformity,00 one can hardly imagine that a comprehensive agree-
ment will emerge from these discussions anytime soon given the vast
disparities in current state tax laws.2 °1
C. Likelihood for Success
The controversy surrounding Internet taxation can be viewed as
both a blessing and a curse. Interest in the topic is both considerable
and diverse. While the Internet is still a fledgling medium, the current
jurisdictional nexus requirements are evolving out of litigation
involving the mail-order catalogue industry.20 2  The mail-order
industry is old, large, and well-established, with a vested interest in the
outcome of any Internet taxation discussions. The young and
disorganized Internet industries are likely to align themselves with the
mail-order catalogue industry in an attempt to keep the debate going
as long as possible. Although some individuals in these industries call
for uniformity in taxation, the industries certainly consider uniformity
a second best alternative to the current scheme of no taxation at all.
Given the influence of special interests and the debate among the
individual states, some commentators have predicted a long wait for
any comprehensive uniform resolution.0 3 However, there is current-
200. See State Taxes: NCSL Takes No Stand on Bill Regarding Internet Taxation, 155
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) H-2 (Aug. 12, 1997) (discussing an appeal by the National Conference
of State Legislatures for federal, state, and local governments to seek a consensus with industry
over Internet tax issues).
201. See Walters, supra note 69, at 15 (outlining some of the variety of current state laws).
202. See Quill, 504 U.S. 298.
203. See Moore, supra note 7, at 205.
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ly an optimistic push for such a solution. President Clinton has stated
that he hopes that such a solution can be in place by January 1,
2000;24 however, the deadline imposed by the Internet Tax Freedom
Act already pushes that goal back nearly two more years. Whether the
development of an interconnected global economy and pressures from
international interests will result in meeting either of these deadlines
remains to be seen.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the substantial growth of Internet commerce and the
current inability of states to tax that commerce, consensus has been
reached that a need exists for the development of a framework
permitting states to capture the revenue they are currently losing while
at the same time preserving the development of Internet commerce.
Given the Supreme Court's holding in Quill, Congress is free to
remove the physical presence requirement from the Commerce Clause
prong of the nexus test. However, regardless of Congress' course
relative to the Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause remains as
an impediment to any taxing model.
This Comment presents three models for state taxation of Internet
commerce that could be used if Congress removes the physical
presence requirement. Both the source and destination tax models
would require court interpretation and refining to determine whether
they can comport with the constitution at all and, if so, in what form
and to what extent. As an alternative, a federal uniform sales tax on
Internet commerce provides a solution that combines the best features
of the source and destination tax models while avoiding the due
process issues. Additionally, the federal solution adopts an approach
in keeping with the international ramifications of our fledgling Internet
policy.
204. See Electronic Commerce: Clinton Unveils Report Advocating National, Global Harmony
on Internet Taxes, 127 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) GG-1 (July 2, 1997).
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